THE
MARIEL EXODUS
A YEAR IN RETROSPECT
THE MARIEL EXODUS
A YEAR IN RETROSPECT
Prepared by:
Silvia M. Unzueta
Special Projects Administrator for Refugee Affairs
April 1981
Metropolitan Dade County Government
Office of the County Manager
Dade County Courthouse, Suite 911
Miami, FL 33130
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to start unraveling the
interrelation between the Cuban "entrant", here called
Marielitos, or Marieleros or persons from Mariel, and the
community life of Dade County, Florida, where most of the
Marielitos reside. Before their arrival, the
population of Dade County was 35% Hispanic, 16% Black
American, and 49% White (Reference: Metro Dade County
Planning Department, 1979). The Black Americans are
about equally divided between those from the Islands and
those from the deep South. After their arrival, the
Hispanic population increased by a half of a percent.
More than most other metropolitan areas, Dade County was a
city of descendants of immigrants or immigrants themselves.
The exodus of over 125,000 Cuban men, women and children
started when more than 10,800 Cubans moved into the grounds
of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, on April 4, 1980, after
the Cuban Government guards were removed from the Peruvian
Embassy. The word quickly spread throughout the
island. The removal of the guards was Castro's
response to a dispute between the Cuban
and the Peruvian Governments, when the previous week a small
group broke
into the Embassy seeking asylum.
At that time, no one predicted that the removal of the Cuban
militia guard from the Embassy was to be interpreted as
anything but "teaching a lesson", to Peruvian
authorities. Instead, in less than twenty-four hours,
over 10,800 Cubans jammed into the Embassy grounds seeking
political asylum. Dramatic photographs of crowded men,
women and children in trees, and on the
Embassy roof without water, food and basic necessities hit
the world press,
creating embarrassment, and pressure for their
release. After extensive
third country negotiations and humanitarian requests from
all over the world,
the Cuban Government agreed to allow the departure of Cubans
holding the
Embassy. Peru, Spain and Costa Rica, along with the
United States, agreed
to give refuge to the 10,800 Cubans seeking political
asylum. During
these negotiations, spontaneous demonstrations of support by
Cuban-Americans throughout the United States, other
countries and the world press, helped to highlight the
incident and eventually helped to achieve the release of
approximately 1,500 of the 10,800 originally in the
Embassy. Upon the arrival of the initial group in San
Jose, Costa Rica, and Madrid, the Cubans shared with the
world media, the horrors lived while at the Embassy.
This exposure generated a negative opinion for the aging
Cuban Revolution. A few days later, in a skillful and
talented show of strategy, Fidel Castro announced the
opening of the Port of Mariel and invited Cuban Americans to
come to Mariel, Cuba, and pick-up their relatives who wanted
to leave the island. The announcement was well-
received by the Cuban-American community which immediately
began what appeared to be an endless flotilla through the
Florida Straits.
After a few weeks, it was evident that the Cuban Government
had no intention of fulfilling their promise. Instead,
some individuals released from jails and mental institutions
became part of the human flow that constituted the Mariel
exodus. The "human avalanche" reached unprecedented
numbers. During the month of May, 88,817 Cubans
arrived. This figure constitutes the largest number of
Cubans that arrived in any single previous year
During May, a number of other factors converged to create a
very special situation. President Carter stated that:
"We will continue to provide an open heart and open arms to
refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination."
That statement was qualified less than a week later.
Decisions surrounding the handling of the Mariel exodus
became entangled in the national political scene.
In Dade County, the initial processing and housing of
refugees was skillfully handled by a handful of local, state
and federal officials under the coordination of Metropolitan
Dade County Government. At Tamiami Park, a twenty-four
hour processing center was set up where more than 1,500
Cubans were scrutinized by Immigration and naturalization
Service, fingerprinted, x- rayed, and released to family,
friends and supportive others. Food, clothing, and
shelter were generously donated by individuals, local
business, and civic groups. The processing and housing
operation involved more than 1,500 volunteers daily,
who worked day and night in a unique and heart warming show
of care and goodwill.
The Tamiami Park opened its' doors on Monday, April 21st and
operated until
the evening of Friday, May 9th, when the process was moved
to an old hanger
near Opa-locka Airport.
That same month, a state of emergency was declared by the
President and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was put into
action.
FEMA is the arm of the federal government responsible for
coping with natural disasters and emergencies. FEMA's
efforts were plagued by a lack of staff with knowledge of
the language and culture of the people arriving, changes
in personnel, policy inconsistencies, lack of clear
direction, and clashes
among various federal agencies. A Cuban-Haitian Task
Force was appointed
in a effort to guide federal efforts during the emergency.
Although many errors were committed and several criticism of
the federal management has been voiced throughout this
process, many individuals were served because of the work
and dedication of workers and volunteers.
FEMA's presence, however, attempted to bring the needed
federal dollars
and the recognition of the exodus as a national
emergency. Meanwhile,
the Cuban Government had turned what had been a negative
internal situation
for them into a serious emergency for some of us in the
United States. The masses of humanity continued
arriving in Key West and other parts of Florida.
In Cuba, one of the results of Mariel was alleviating
serious internal administrative
and political problems, and exporting a high risk population
to its political
rival, the United States. The exodus freed jobs,
houses, and prison
space for the Cuban establishment, and these were critically
needed in the
island. The departure of dissidents and other marginal
persons, relieved
Cuba from explosive internal pressure.
At this time, still in May, another phenomenon took place:
FEMA opened four refugee camps in Florida, Arkansas,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin:
1. Eglin Air Force Base in Northwest Florida, housing
10,025. This was the first camp, a city of tents.
2. Indian town Gap, in Pennsylvania with a population
of 19,094 Cuban refugees.
3. Ft. McCoy, in Wisconsin, housing 14,243.
4. Ft. Chaffee in Ft. Smith, Arkansas with 19,060
refugees.
The continued human migration and the inability of
authorities to cope with the large numbers at their
immediate point of arrival, offered little alternative but
to use these four military installations.
Life in camp began another chapter in the lives of these new
immigrants. Physical and psychological abuse, beatings
and rapes were happening along with riots as the weeks went
by and many Cubans remained tangled-up in the red tape of
federal bureaucratic management. At one point in the
month of June, more than 62,000 Cubans were in the four
camps.
The processing and resettlement of these individuals was
delayed while diverse Voluntary Resettlement Agencies
(VOLAGS), in contract with the Department of State, tried to
seek and place the Cubans throughout the United
States. In expediting their placement, credentials and
careful matching with potential sponsors was not always
followed. As a result, the rate of broken sponsorships
was estimated to be as high as 30% to 40% of those
resettled. Most of
those without relatives and who had broken away from their
sponsors or "padrinos",
gravitated to areas of high Hispanic populations.
California, New York,
New Jersey, and Florida became primary targets where
homeless Cubans sought
refuge.
In the Miami, Dade County area, where the largest number is
still being
concentrated, their presence created another emergency for
public officials.
Emergency temporary housing measures included opening up the
Orange Bowl
and making cots available to those with no place to
stay. The Orange
Bowl was opened by the City of Miami in the second week of
June. On
June 20th Metro Dade County obtained a special allocation
from Washington
to feed refugees breakfast and one hot meal a day.
Those staying at
the Orange Bowl were certified for food stamp assistance by
HRS - Food Stamp
Division. But as the stadium is the home of the Miami
Dolphins, the
City of Miami decided to establish another temporary
facility erected by
July 21st: a tent city under a downtown expressway. Up
to 800 Cubans
were housed in Tent City at one time, and more than 4,000
lived there during
the two months it was open. Tent City remained open
until September
30, 1980. Simultaneously, with the operation of Tent
City and the increasing
number of broken sponsorship, the wave of weekly hijackings
of commercial
planes by Cubans, (up to three a day) made national
headlines.
Reflecting on the Mariel Flotilla, it is clear that it's
final chapter are still unfolding. More than 3,000
still remain in Ft. Chaffee, now a modern-day concentration
camp, were men and a few women await the opportunity to
enjoy life in the United States. Efforts to relocate
the last refugees and close the camp have failed.
Major communities heavily impacted by
the Mariel refugee population have demanded careful planning
and screening on the part of the federal agencies handling
their resettlement.
Demographic Characteristics of the Mariel Refugees
One of the most severe problems surrounding the Mariel
population has been the lack of factual information as to
the characteristics of the group.
In a brief six month period, 125,266 (Reference: Official
figure released by INS) Cubans entered the United
States. Now, twelve months later, accurate demographic
information about the group remains unavailable. To
date, one of the few officials data released, is the one
obtained of the first 61,569 refugees who arrived and where
processed in Miami.
Initial Group (Reference: John Lasseville) Processed in
Miami, Fla.:
Males - 55.2%
Females - 44.8%
Age group 15-45 - 54.7%
Age group 23-35 - 29.2%
"Immediate Family" in U.S. - 28.5%
---TOTAL - 61,569
Key elements in the composition of this population are age,
race, educational level and family ties. Although no
conclusive figures are available, individuals familiar with
the Mariel population place the umber of non-Whites as high
as 30% to 40%, and males making up approximately 60% to 70%
of the population. The average educational level is
estimated to be between the 6th and the 9th
grade, with few of the arrivals being able to communicate in
any language but Spanish.
Perhaps the most serious problem this group faces is a lack
of attachment to family and friends outside of Cuba.
This lack of a support system has often inhibited effective
resettlement efforts.
Juan Clark, in "The 1980 Mariel Exodus: An Assessment and
Prospect," estimate that "about 50,000 men came without
their families." He further estimates that about
20,000 men were forced by the Cuban government to be
separated from their spouses in coming to the United States,
in violation of their human
rights.
Unaccompanied Minors
Dr. Jose Szapocznik, Director of CAMP, Cuban-American
Adolescent Management Program, University of Miami,
Department of Psychiatry, Spanish Family Guidance Center,
which provided services to Cuban unaccompanied minors,
reports their total in the camps at 672. Of those more
specific information was obtained on 549 cases; of these:
55 or 10% were females
43% were non-white
18% have been or were in a marital or paired relationship
12% reported coming directly from jail
50% reported having been in jail at some point of their
lives
59% reported having some relative in U.S., but only about
half of these
could give any portion of an address.
Parental occupation and education was reported to be:
70% labor/agricultural
20% skilled labor
10% professional
Szapocznik reports that a large portion of the interviewees
appeared to
have poor adjustment to school. Sixty-five percent
stated that they
had stopped going to school. The rough literacy
assessment turned up
approximately 8% illiteracy rate.
Six of the 55 female minors stated that they thought or knew
that they were pregnant at the time of the interview.
Fifty-six, or almost 10% of the
respondents reported sexual abuse, venereal disease or
multiple sexual problems
in their recent or distant past.
Clinical judgements of a series of psychiatric symptoms and
conditions reported the following characteristics:
47% had experienced behavioral problems in Cuba
14% had experienced hallucinations
8% had experienced delusions
31% were or had been clinically depressed
22% had experienced suicidal tendencies
14% had made a suicide attempt
Although much political has been given to the criminal
record of this population, reliable information is not
available. The Immigration and naturalization Services
had 1,761 or 1.4% in custody, charged with committing
felonies and other serious crimes in Cuba. Most of
these remain in jails throughout the United States, for
crimes committed outside of the U.S. A total of 23,927
were considered by INS as non-felon criminal and political
prisoners, representing 19.1% of the total arrivals.
It is very unfortunate that the two categories were lumped
together into one total figure.
Much has also been said about the percentage of homosexuals
in those arriving from Mariel. However, no data is
available as to the actual number of
homosexuals in the Mariel population.
The Mariel Boatlift ended in the same abrupt manner it had
started, with Fidel Castro's instruction on September 26,
1980, that boats waiting to pick up relatives in Mariel
Harbor return home empty. On September 26, the exodus
that had brought to our shores 125,266 Cuban men, women and
children in 2,011 boats and one airplane was
concluded. In final negotiations between the United
States an Cuban officials, during the end of September, the
Cuban government advised the United States Interest Section
in Havana of an additional 600 Cubans stranded by the abrupt
closure of Mariel, and requested they be cleared for
admission into the United States. The U.S. accepted
the Cuban government's request and agreed to bring these
Cubans to Miami, after careful screening by U.S. authorities
in Havana. These individuals were granted full
"refugee status," they are not classified as entrants.
Legal Implications
Throughout this paper reference is made to ‘refugees".
Legally, the individuals coming in the Mariel Flotilla have
been granted the new administrative category of
"entrant". This technicality rendered them ineligible
for assistance available through the U.S. Refugee Act of
1980. Many experts believe that the denial of refugee
status to these people greatly contributed to the many
problems encountered a all levels. It was through the
Fascell - Stone Amendment to the Refugee Act of 1980, that
special funding was authorized, and in the form of cash
assistance, reached the entrants during the latter part of
February 1981.
The Mariel experience dramatized the need to look at the
U.S. immigration laws and to re- evaluate the 1980 Refugee
Act. The Select Commission on Immigration felt a wave
of public pressure as a direct result of Mariel. The
Commission's final report was issued in March 1981, in
Washington, D.C. The Commission made important
recommendations in the area of U.S. Immigration.
Dade County, Florida
Official estimates put the number of Mariel refugees in the
Dade County
area at over 90,000. Despite resettlement activities
aimed at relocating refugees out of this area, it is
anticipated that many have not left Dade County and many,
resettled out of the State of Florida, have turned to it.
By the end of 1980, it was estimated that a large number of
Cuban entrants will be added to the total record in the U.S.
Census, conducted April 1, 1980.
It becomes difficult to overstate the impact of this wave of
refugees on the social, economical and institutional
framework of the Dade County community. The emergency
nature and the short span of time involved in the arrival of
many thousands of people has been particularly taxing to the
existing governmental entities, and to the residents of this
community. Their arrival coincided with an
increasing flow of Haitians seeking freedom from Haiti and
the Bahamas.
Governmental Services
Social security, driver license and food stamp offices
became overwhelmed by the great number of people requesting
services. Lines at the INS Office begin forming daily
in the early hours of the orning. Medical care demand
at the County hospital and in community mental health
centers and other social service programs, has increased
substantially.
Unemployment
Although the official unemployment figures for Dade County
are reported
at 6.7% these exclude an estimated 50,800 unemployed
Cuban/Haitian entrants who increase the actual unemployment
rate for the area to 13.0%. Many of the Cubans require
upgrading of their skills before they are able to find jobs.
As of mid March 1981, the Little Havana Manpower Agency
reports 3,046 individuals on a waiting list. Of these
2,893 o 94.9% are Mariel refugees. The same agency
reports having placed, from April 21 to March 1981, 2,165
persons in various jobs. Of these only 285 or 13.1%
were Mariel refugees. The above figures confirm the
severe unemployment problems experienced by the newly
arrived group.
Housing
Dade County's rental housing market has a vacancy rate of
less than 0.5%. Overcrowding indexes in Hispanic
communities was high even prior to the Mariel influx.
It was to these areas that many of the new refugees came
adding to the existing housing crunch. Rent has
skyrocketed, further curtailing the ability of the new
arrivals to secure adequate and safe housing.
Education
By the end of December, 1980, the Dade County public school
system was hit with approximately 13,800 Cuban children in
grades K-12 (ages 5 to 17). The children, fluent only
in Spanish, came into an already overcrowded system which
continues to make every effort to respond to community
needs, in spite of severe funding constraints.
Criminal Justice
The increase of criminal activity has been one of more item
often blamed on the Mariel refugees. As of December
26, 1980, Unzueta reports that of 163 Cubans charged an/or
convicted felons housed in Dade County's main jail 103 or
63.9% are Mariel refugees, 11 or 6.8% are Cuban ex-
political prisoners, and 47 or 29.1% are
Cuban-Americans. Mariel refugees represented 9.8% of
individuals in the main jail. In the Women's Detention
Center, where females either charged or convicted of
felonies or misdemeanors are housed Unzueta reports 8 or
4.6% Cuban-American women along with 8 or 4.6% Mariel Cuban
females and 7 homosexual Mariel males. Mariel refugee
women
represent 4.6% of the total females, while Mariel homosexual
men represent 4.0% of the total individuals housed in the
Women's Detention Center on December 26, 1980. The
increase in criminal activity has impacted heavily on the
entire Dade County judicial system.
Mariel Deaths
While no specific data is available on the total number of
Mariel deaths a study was conducted by Unzueta of dead
Mariel refugees who were taken to Dade County's Medical
Examiner Office. It is estimated that the Medical
Examiner's Office receives only 33.9% or one-third of all
County deaths, and
all homicides and suicides. An analysis of the Medical
Examiner's records
for the period between April 21, 1980 to March 31, 1981,
indicates 101 Mariel
refugee cases came through this office.
Homicides represented fifty-seven or 56.4% of those cases,
followed by natural deaths, which represented twenty-three
or 22.7%, accidents with eleven or 10.8% and ten or 9.9%
suicides. Seventy-eight or 77.2% were white and
twenty-three or 22.7% were black. Eighty-eight or
87.1% were males, while thirteen or 12.8% were
females. The average age of the Mariel cases was 41.8
years.
Metro Dade County's Involvement
The County's involvement began early as the coordinating
entity in charge of processing Cubans during the first
nineteen days.
Throughout the past year, Metro Dade has worked hand in hand
with the legislative delegation and the Governor to lobby
for the passage of the Fascell-Stone legislation.
The County's social delivery system has been, and continues
to be, heavily impacted with the Cubans who came through the
Mariel-Key West Flotilla.
During 1980, Metro Dade County obtained a grant from the
Department of Health and Social Services - Office of Refugee
Resettlement, for the purpose of implementing
a three phase program for Cuban and Haitian entrants.
The grant will address the following critical areas:
1. Development and implementation of a community and
entrant need
assessment to determine specific needs faced by the Cuban
and Haitian entrant
population, along with an evaluation of existing social
service needs, their
present capabilities and need for future expansion. A
Resources Directory
of services available to entrants will be compiled as a
result of this survey.
2. Development and Implementation of Training Program
for social services and mental health professionals at
various levels of government and non-profit agencies to
insure that existing and new services are known and
utilized. The training will familiarize approximately
200 participants with the characteristics of the entrant
population and review resources available to serve them.
3. Development of a proposal application for a
Comprehensive Individualized Assessment Center where
entrants exhibiting serious social and/or mental problems
would be administered a biosocial/psychological evaluation
and channeled for
referral and resettlement to communities and programs where
their individual needs could be met.
The grant is scheduled to run twelve (12) months for the
period from January 1, 1981 through December 31, 1981.
Dr. Kay Flynn, Special Assistant to the Director of the
Department of Human Resources is the Project Director.
The publishing and release, in May, of the results of the
assessment of
the needs of Dade County entrants will be a significant
contribution to clarify the needs of this population.
A Cuban Haitian Entrant Advisory Committee has been convened
by the County to address special issues and concerns related
to the Entrants in Dade County. The Committee, chaired
by Assistant County Manager Sergio Pereira and staffed by
Silvia Unzueta, Special Projects Administrator for Refugee
Affairs, is made up of thirteen individuals who represent
various levels of government, the school system, religious
groups and the community at large. The bringing
together of this Committee is a step in the right direction
as better communication and solution strategies are
discussed and evaluated by various levels of officials and
community leaders.
End of Page
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