CUBAN
ANTI-CASTRO
TERRORISM
[Reference: binder part 7 ]
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D.C. 20535
May 16, 1990
CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO TERRORISM
For
information
of recipients, the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (TRAC) is
producing
a continuing series of short, informative articles on a variety of
topics
relating to FBI terrorism investigations. The following addresses
a
series of bombings in Florida and the issue of anti-Castro terrorism.
Since
May, 1987, the Miami, Florida metropolitan area has been the site of at
least
25 bombings or attempted bombings. Fifteen attacks have been
directed
against similar targets, i.e., persons or businesses with alleged
sympathies
or ties to the Government of Cuba. The 15 bombings have involved
the
use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mostly pipe bombs.
Some
bombing components have been positively linked through forensic
analysis.
Only one of the 15 bombings has been claimed - by the Organization
Alliance
of Cuban Intransigence (or Intransigent Cubans) (AIC) - and is listed
as
a terrorist incident by the FBI. Of the remaining 14 bombings, 12
have
been designated as suspected terrorist incidents.
Despite
the lack of explanatory communiques for the attacks, it is apparent
from
the chosen targets that anti-Cuban Communism is the principal issue
behind
the bombings. These attacks are not the first of their kind
committed
to further the goals of anti-Castro Cubans; rather, they are a
continuation
of a long-standing fight against the Communist Government of
Cuba.
Ever since the late 1950s, when the first exiles escaping the
Communists
on Cuba arrived in the United States, there has been almost constant
anti-
Castro Cuban activities in Florida and elsewhere. Various groups
were
organized among the exiles. Although some of these groups have
been
no more than social organizations, others were comprised of militants
who
sought to overthrow the Castro regime through violence. This
resulted
in bombings, assassinations and other acts of violence against
pro-Cuban
Communist targets. Through the years, different groups emerged to
either
claim credit or be held responsible for the acts of terrorism.
The
attacks
by militant anti-Castro Cubans initially involved armed incursions by
land
or sea onto the Cuban mainland, but by the middle of the 1960's,
individuals
or businesses in the United States began to be increasingly
targeted
One of the early leading anti-Castro Cubans was Orlando Bosch Avila, a
Cuban
national, who arrived as an exile from Cuba in 1960. He was the
leader
of the anti-Castro group, Revolutionary Recovery Insurrection Movement
(MIRR).
In June, 1965, he and four others were arrested near Orlando, Florida,
with
18 aerial bombs, small arms and ammunition. These munitions were
allegedly
to be used by Bosch and his associates to bomb targets in Cuba.
Bosch
claimed at the time of his arrest that his group had already conducted
two
aerial attacks against Cuba; however, this information could not be
corroborated.
All of the defendants were later acquitted of charges that they had
conspired
to violate the Munitions Control Act.
By
January,
1968, Bosch had organized a militant activist group called Cuban Power,
although
he still maintained the leadership of MIRR. In January, Cuban
Power
claimed credit for the bombing of a B-25 cargo plane at the Miami
International
Airport. This was followed by other attacks claimed by Cuban
Power.
Some of these attacks, however, were not committed by Bosch's
group.
There were two factions of Cuban Power, neither aligned to the
other.
Bosch controlled one faction, while the other was led by another Cuban
militant,
Hector Cornillot.
Bosch's
group did not commit another act until May, 1968, when it claimed to
have
bombed a British freighter in Key West, Florida, and a Japanese
freighter
in Tampa, Florida. Bosch's faction, furthermore, sent cablegram
extortion
messages to the following heads of state: Harold Wilson (Great
Britain);
Gustavo Ordaz (Mexico); and Francisco Franco (Spain). These
leaders
were warned that attacks would be conducted against their countries'
ships
and planes unless trade with Cuba was stopped. The cablegrams
were
signed: "Ernesto, General Delegate of Cuban Power."
Communiques
were also issued by "Ernesto" claiming credit for the bombings in
January
and May, 1968. It was later determined that Orlando Bosch was
Ernesto.
Between
January, 1961 and May, 1968, more than 30 violent acts were either
claimed
by or attributed to Bosch. These included bombings, armed
incursions
and aerial attacks against targets in Cuba, Panama and the United
States.
In the summer of 1968, Bosch claimed to have placed 36 pounds of
explosives
against the hull of a British freighter, the "Lancastrian
Princess."
The explosives were recovered. They had been attacked to the
ship's
hull by chains. The explosives were part of a 300-pound supply
which
had been provided to Bosch in an FBI operation. Bosch also
indicated
that he had placed explosives on six other freighters belonging to
Great
Britain and Japan; however, this could not be verified.
On
September
16, 1968, an attack was conducted against a Polish vessel, "Polanica,"
in
Miami Bay, with a 57 millimeter recoilless rifle. Less than a
month
later, Bosch and eight others were arrested and charged with this
assault.
They were also charged in connection with the mailing of extortion
letters
to the three heads of state and with conspiracy to damage ships of
foreign
registry.
Bosch
was convicted of the charges against him on November 15, 1968, and
sentenced
to 10 years' imprisonment. On December 15, 1972, he was released
on
parole from the United State Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. In
April,
1974, he left the United States for South America in violation of his
parole.
Bosch's
arrest and departure from the United States did not end the anti-Castro
terrorism.
In late 1974, another militant, anti-Castro group, Omega 7, was founded
by
Eduardo Arocena. His reason for organizing this group was his
belief
that the anti-Castro movement was not active enough in seeking the
violent
overthrow of the Castro Government. The membership of Omega 7 was
drawn
from the (Jose) Marti Insurrectional Movement, an anti-Castro group.
During
an eight-year period beginning in 1975, Omega 7 members were reportedly
responsible
for between 30 and 50 bombings and two assassinations. The exact
number
of these attacks cannot be determined because other anti-Castro groups,
such
as the Cuban Nationalist Movement (CNM), issued false claims of credit
on
behalf of Omega 7 which confused law enforcement. Omega 7-claimed
acts
occurred in the New York City metropolitan area, the Miami metropolitan
area,
and Washington D.C. Among these acts were attacks against
individuals
sympathetic to or businesses dealing with Communist Cuba, Cuban
Government
interests, and interests of other countries dealings with Cuba.
Omega
7 was neutralized when Arocena was arrested during July, 1983, in
Miami.
He had in his possession automatic weapons and bombing
paraphernalia.
He was convicted on a 25-count indictment which included charges of
first
degree murder, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)
violations and bombing and explosives violations. More than a
dozen
Omega 7 members or their associates were also charged and convicted,
mostly
on criminal contempt violations for failure to testify before a Federal
grand
jury. Two Omega 7 members cooperated with Federal
prosecutors.
A third, Jose Ignacio Gonzalez, fled the country before he could
testify.
He remains a fugitive and is believed to be in Guatemala.
Arocena
was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 35 years. Prison
sentences
for other convicted Omega 7 members ranged from four to nine
years.
In 1984, Arocena was also convicted in two trials on charges involving
weapons
violations, bombings and conspiracy. He was sentenced to an
additional
20 years' imprisonment to run concurrent with his earlier
sentence.
Furthermore, in 1986, three Omega 7 members, Pedro Remon, Andres Garcia
and
Eduardo Fernandez, each of whom had been sentenced previously to 5
years'
imprisonment on contempt charges, pleaded guilty to charges of
conspiracy
to murder a foreign official and conspiracy to bomb or destroy property
of
a foreign government. Each received a 10-year prison sentence.
Of
the
Omega 7 members who were imprisoned, only four - Arocena, Garcia,
Fernandez
and Ramon - remain in jail. All of the others have been
paroled.
Omega 7 has never been able to recover from these arrests. Even
after
those who were imprisoned were released, the group was not
reestablished
to the extent that it had been. Perhaps the fact that the leader,
Arocena,
remains in custody has had some bearing on this.
The
last
act that was claimed by Omega 7 was in May, 1983, several weeks before
Arocena
was arrested. No additional anti-Castro styled bombings are known
to
have been committed until May, 1987, when the current series of attacks
began.
The Cuban anti-Communist movement, to be sure, had not lain dormant
during
this four-year period. The Omega 7 arrests eliminated neither the
anti-Castro
feelings nor the radicals who saw violence as their only
recourse.
The arrests, however, did temper, albeit for a short period, the
violent
activities of the radicals.
Because
reasons for an attack were given in only one instance, it is not known
why
bombings began anew in May, 1987, or what event, if any, triggered
them.
Since the initial targets were freight forwarding companies, thorough
which
goods are transported to Cuba via third countries, one possible motive
might
be to force these companies to stop. It is also not presently
known
whether all of the attacks are interrelated and are the result of
efforts
of one group, or if they are alike solely because of the general nature
of
the target - anti-Castroism - and are being committed by more than one
group.
Before this can be determined, there are many differences and
similarities
which need to be considered regarding targets, victims and modus
operandi.
Of
the
13 attacks which appear to be anti-Castro in nature and which have been
designated
as either terrorist incidents or suspected terrorist incidents, nine
involved
the use of pipe bombs, of which one failed to detonate. They are
as
follows:
--
May 1, 1987, a pipe bombing at Cubanacan in Miami;
--
May 2, 1987, a pipe bombing at Almacen El Espanol in Hialeah, Florida;
--
May 25, 1987, a pipe bombing at Cuba Envios in Miami
--
July 30, 1987, a pipe bombing at Machi Community Services in Miami;
--
August 27, 1987, a pipe bombing at Va Cuba in Hialeah;
--
January 2, 1988, a pipe bombing at Miami-Cuban in Miami;
--
May 3, 1988, a pipe bombing at the Cuban Museum of Arts and Culture in
Miami;
--
May 26, 1988, a bombing at the residence of the executive director for
the Institute of Cuban Studies in
Coral
Gables, Florida, claimed by the AIC;
--
September 5, 1988, a pipe bombing at Bela Cuba in Miami;
--
September 18, 1988, a bombing intended for a leader of the Reunion
Flotilla,
a group which advocates that all persons
should be able to enter or leave Cuba as
they
please, in Miami;
--
February 24, 1989, an attempted pipe bombing at Almacen El Espanol in
Miami;
--
March 26, 1989, a bombing at Marazul Charters in Miami; and
--
September 10, 1989, a bombing at Super Optical in Hialeah.
Of
the
12 successful bombings, 11 occurred either during the late evening or
early
morning hours, between 10:20 p.m. and 3:45 a.m.; the most recent
attack
occurred at 5:50 a.m. Although some of the bombings have
specifically
targeted residences, there have been no deaths or injuries as a result.
None
of
the pipe bombings were claimed, and no prior warning calls were
received.
Only one of the other bombings was claimed, and in another, targeting a
leader
of the Reunion Flotilla, there was a warning call but no claim of
credit.
These two attacks were unlike any of the other bombings in that private
residences
were targeted. In the other attacks, businesses and in one case a
museum
were targeted.
The
first
six bombings have been positively linked through forensic
analysis.
Toolmarks on the six devices are identical, indicating that the same
tool
was used to construct them. Tests have not been completed on the
remaining
pipe bombings. It has not been determined if they are identical
to
the first six. The first six pipe bombings are also similar in
that
the targets were Cuban freight forwarding companies. The other
pipe
bombings are similar to the first six attacks in that Cuban businesses
were
attacked. In all of the pipe bombings, the targets involved
pro-Communist
Cuban interests.
In
addition,
forensic analysis has not been completed on the remaining four
explosions.
Therefore, it has not been determined whether they are similar in
construction
to one another or to the first six pipe bombings. Two of these
attacks
were against targets similar to those of the pipe bombings, (Cuban
businesses).
But two were completely different in that residences were targeted and
one
of these was claimed.
On
May
25, 1988, a bomb detonated at the home of the executive director of the
Institute
of Cuban Studies in Hialeah, Florida. A telephone caller to a
Spanish
language radio station claimed credit for the bombing on behalf of the
AIC.
This bombing was the eight in the series that began in May, 1987.
The
other attack against a residence occurred on September 18, 1988.
The
intended target was the residence of a leader of the Reunion
Flotilla.
On September 17, a telephone call to the residence advised that a
bombing
would occur and that a certain individual would be responsible.
On
September 18, a bomb exploded. However, it was at a residence
with
an address similar to but different from the one at which the warning
call
was received. A telephone caller later claimed that the wrong
building
had been bombed. The person whose name was given as being
responsible
was found not to have been involved.
Several
suspects have been identified in the current wave of bombings.
However,
because of the differences in the targets and in the types of bombing
devices
used, it is not known if the same individuals or group is responsible
for
all of the attacks.
Furthermore,
there are some indications, that the bombings may have connections to
earlier
anti-Castro militants. The one recent bombing that was claimed by
AIC,
for example, was reportedly committed on behalf of Orlando Bosch.
Bosch,
following his flight to South America in 1974, became involved in
another
anti-Castro group. In 1976, he was arrested by Venezuelan
authorities
for his involvement in the bombing of a Cuban airliner in which 73
people
died. Bosch spent 11 years in prison during which he was twice
tried
and acquitted for this crime. He was released in August
1987.
Three months later, he applied for permission to enter the United
States
but was denied a non-immigrant visa. Nevertheless, on February
16,
1988, he arrived in Miami, Florida, without entry documents and was
arrested
by the U.S. Marshals on a warrant based on his 1974 parole
violation.
He served three months in prison.
Following
his release on May 16, 1988 Bosch was rearrested by the Immigration and
Naturalization
Service (INS) and given notice that the U.S. Government considered him
excludable.
His parole into the United States was also denied by the U.S. District
Court,
Southern District of Florida. Because he posed a flight risk, he
was
ordered detained until a decision could be reached on his
deportation.
On May 25, 1988, the AIC-claimed bombing occurred. The caller who
claimed
credit stated that if Bosch was not released within a specified time,
reprisals
would be taken against the INS district director in Miami. On
June
2, 1988, the day after Bosch legal efforts to effect his release from
custody
were denied, the AIC threatened to bomb the Miami INS office if Bosch
was
not released.
On
this
same date, a letter was received by a Spanish language newspaper
in
Los Angeles. The letter states that the group had bombs and
grenades
and that the group had already committed eight bombings in Miami.
No
connection however, could be found between this letter and the Miami
bombings.
The
Orlando
Bosch issue was given as the motive for only one of the attacks, but it
may
be a factor of greater significance. U.S. Government efforts to
deport
Bosch have been decried by a number of his supporters, including
militants
such as Ramon Sanchez, an Omega 7 member, who had been convicted and
imprisoned
in 1984. Threats of violence have been made against FBI and INS
offices
should the Government's efforts to deport Bosch be successful.
Sanchez's
open support for Bosch, as well as his past propensity for violence,
have
caused law enforcement to look into any involvement that h or any other
Omega
7 members may have with these bombings.
The
Bosch
deportation issue cannot account for all of the bombings as it (the
issue)
did not become a factor until after seven bombings had occurred.
The
bombings initially may have been influenced by the paroling of Omega 7
members,
such as Ramon Sanchez. The attacks may have been committed to
show
that the militant anti-Castro movement had not been destroyed despite
the
Omega 7 arrests and Arocena's continued imprisonment.
If
all
of the bombings are the responsibility of one group, the Bosch issue
may
have been seized upon as a means to expand the group's activist base by
attracting
militant Bosch supporters. If more than one group is responsible
for
the attack, the second group may have been influenced by the seven
successful
bombings within a year. It may also be possible that some of the
bombings
are being committed by pro-Castro forces as a means of bringing adverse
publicity
to and law enforcement efforts against anti-Castro factions.
What has become
apparent
is that the bombings will not likely end until there no longer exists a
reason
for them to continue. Arrests may cause the bombings to cease
temporarily,
but it will not cause them to stop entirely. The history of the
militant
anti- Castro movement has proven this. The issue behind the
attacks
is so emotional a topic that it remains largely unchanged even after 30
years.
And there is no reason to suspect that it will cease to be an issue as
long
as the status quo remains. It therefore behooves law enforcement
to
continue efforts to apprehend those responsible for the attacks, but at
the
same time, not lose sight of the fact that eventually bombers will
return
as long as Castro is in power or Cuba remains communist.
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