CUBAN
ANTI-CASTRO
TERRORISM
[Reference: binder part 7 ]
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D.C. 20535
May 16, 1990
CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO TERRORISM
For
information
of recipients, the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center
(TRAC) is
producing
a continuing series of short, informative articles on a
variety of
topics
relating to FBI terrorism investigations. The
following addresses
a
series of bombings in Florida and the issue of anti-Castro
terrorism.
Since
May,
1987, the Miami, Florida metropolitan area has been the site
of at
least
25 bombings or attempted bombings. Fifteen attacks
have been
directed
against similar targets, i.e., persons or businesses with
alleged
sympathies
or ties to the Government of Cuba. The 15 bombings
have involved
the
use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mostly pipe
bombs.
Some
bombing components have been positively linked through
forensic
analysis.
Only one of the 15 bombings has been claimed - by the
Organization
Alliance
of Cuban Intransigence (or Intransigent Cubans) (AIC) - and
is listed
as
a terrorist incident by the FBI. Of the remaining 14
bombings, 12
have
been designated as suspected terrorist incidents.
Despite
the
lack of explanatory communiques for the attacks, it is
apparent
from
the chosen targets that anti-Cuban Communism is the
principal issue
behind
the bombings. These attacks are not the first of their
kind
committed
to further the goals of anti-Castro Cubans; rather, they are
a
continuation
of a long-standing fight against the Communist Government of
Cuba.
Ever since the late 1950s, when the first exiles escaping
the
Communists
on Cuba arrived in the United States, there has been almost
constant
anti-
Castro Cuban activities in Florida and elsewhere.
Various groups
were
organized among the exiles. Although some of these
groups have
been
no more than social organizations, others were comprised of
militants
who
sought to overthrow the Castro regime through
violence. This
resulted
in bombings, assassinations and other acts of violence
against
pro-Cuban
Communist targets. Through the years, different groups
emerged to
either
claim credit or be held responsible for the acts of
terrorism.
The
attacks
by militant anti-Castro Cubans initially involved armed
incursions by
land
or sea onto the Cuban mainland, but by the middle of the
1960's,
individuals
or businesses in the United States began to be increasingly
targeted
One of the early leading anti-Castro Cubans was Orlando
Bosch Avila, a
Cuban
national, who arrived as an exile from Cuba in 1960.
He was the
leader
of the anti-Castro group, Revolutionary Recovery
Insurrection Movement
(MIRR).
In June, 1965, he and four others were arrested near
Orlando, Florida,
with
18 aerial bombs, small arms and ammunition. These
munitions were
allegedly
to be used by Bosch and his associates to bomb targets in
Cuba.
Bosch
claimed at the time of his arrest that his group had already
conducted
two
aerial attacks against Cuba; however, this information could
not be
corroborated.
All of the defendants were later acquitted of charges that
they had
conspired
to violate the Munitions Control Act.
By
January,
1968, Bosch had organized a militant activist group called
Cuban Power,
although
he still maintained the leadership of MIRR. In
January, Cuban
Power
claimed credit for the bombing of a B-25 cargo plane at the
Miami
International
Airport. This was followed by other attacks claimed by
Cuban
Power.
Some of these attacks, however, were not committed by
Bosch's
group.
There were two factions of Cuban Power, neither aligned to
the
other.
Bosch controlled one faction, while the other was led by
another Cuban
militant,
Hector Cornillot.
Bosch's
group
did not commit another act until May, 1968, when it claimed
to
have
bombed a British freighter in Key West, Florida, and a
Japanese
freighter
in Tampa, Florida. Bosch's faction, furthermore, sent
cablegram
extortion
messages to the following heads of state: Harold
Wilson (Great
Britain);
Gustavo Ordaz (Mexico); and Francisco Franco (Spain).
These
leaders
were warned that attacks would be conducted against their
countries'
ships
and planes unless trade with Cuba was stopped. The
cablegrams
were
signed: "Ernesto, General Delegate of Cuban
Power."
Communiques
were also issued by "Ernesto" claiming credit for the
bombings in
January
and May, 1968. It was later determined that Orlando
Bosch was
Ernesto.
Between
January,
1961 and May, 1968, more than 30 violent acts were either
claimed
by or attributed to Bosch. These included bombings,
armed
incursions
and aerial attacks against targets in Cuba, Panama and the
United
States.
In the summer of 1968, Bosch claimed to have placed 36
pounds of
explosives
against the hull of a British freighter, the "Lancastrian
Princess."
The explosives were recovered. They had been attacked
to the
ship's
hull by chains. The explosives were part of a
300-pound supply
which
had been provided to Bosch in an FBI operation. Bosch
also
indicated
that he had placed explosives on six other freighters
belonging to
Great
Britain and Japan; however, this could not be verified.
On
September
16, 1968, an attack was conducted against a Polish vessel,
"Polanica,"
in
Miami Bay, with a 57 millimeter recoilless rifle. Less
than a
month
later, Bosch and eight others were arrested and charged with
this
assault.
They were also charged in connection with the mailing of
extortion
letters
to the three heads of state and with conspiracy to damage
ships of
foreign
registry.
Bosch
was
convicted of the charges against him on November 15, 1968,
and
sentenced
to 10 years' imprisonment. On December 15, 1972, he
was released
on
parole from the United State Penitentiary at Marion,
Illinois. In
April,
1974, he left the United States for South America in
violation of his
parole.
Bosch's
arrest
and departure from the United States did not end the
anti-Castro
terrorism.
In late 1974, another militant, anti-Castro group, Omega 7,
was founded
by
Eduardo Arocena. His reason for organizing this group
was his
belief
that the anti-Castro movement was not active enough in
seeking the
violent
overthrow of the Castro Government. The membership of
Omega 7 was
drawn
from the (Jose) Marti Insurrectional Movement, an
anti-Castro group.
During
an
eight-year period beginning in 1975, Omega 7 members were
reportedly
responsible
for between 30 and 50 bombings and two assassinations.
The exact
number
of these attacks cannot be determined because other
anti-Castro groups,
such
as the Cuban Nationalist Movement (CNM), issued false claims
of credit
on
behalf of Omega 7 which confused law enforcement.
Omega 7-claimed
acts
occurred in the New York City metropolitan area, the Miami
metropolitan
area,
and Washington D.C. Among these acts were attacks
against
individuals
sympathetic to or businesses dealing with Communist Cuba,
Cuban
Government
interests, and interests of other countries dealings with
Cuba.
Omega
7
was neutralized when Arocena was arrested during July, 1983,
in
Miami.
He had in his possession automatic weapons and bombing
paraphernalia.
He was convicted on a 25-count indictment which included
charges of
first
degree murder, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act
(RICO)
violations and bombing and explosives violations. More
than a
dozen
Omega 7 members or their associates were also charged and
convicted,
mostly
on criminal contempt violations for failure to testify
before a Federal
grand
jury. Two Omega 7 members cooperated with Federal
prosecutors.
A third, Jose Ignacio Gonzalez, fled the country before he
could
testify.
He remains a fugitive and is believed to be in Guatemala.
Arocena
was
sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 35 years.
Prison
sentences
for other convicted Omega 7 members ranged from four to nine
years.
In 1984, Arocena was also convicted in two trials on charges
involving
weapons
violations, bombings and conspiracy. He was sentenced
to an
additional
20 years' imprisonment to run concurrent with his earlier
sentence.
Furthermore, in 1986, three Omega 7 members, Pedro Remon,
Andres Garcia
and
Eduardo Fernandez, each of whom had been sentenced
previously to 5
years'
imprisonment on contempt charges, pleaded guilty to charges
of
conspiracy
to murder a foreign official and conspiracy to bomb or
destroy property
of
a foreign government. Each received a 10-year prison
sentence.
Of
the
Omega 7 members who were imprisoned, only four - Arocena,
Garcia,
Fernandez
and Ramon - remain in jail. All of the others have
been
paroled.
Omega 7 has never been able to recover from these
arrests. Even
after
those who were imprisoned were released, the group was not
reestablished
to the extent that it had been. Perhaps the fact that
the leader,
Arocena,
remains in custody has had some bearing on this.
The
last
act that was claimed by Omega 7 was in May, 1983, several
weeks before
Arocena
was arrested. No additional anti-Castro styled
bombings are known
to
have been committed until May, 1987, when the current series
of attacks
began.
The Cuban anti-Communist movement, to be sure, had not lain
dormant
during
this four-year period. The Omega 7 arrests eliminated
neither the
anti-Castro
feelings nor the radicals who saw violence as their only
recourse.
The arrests, however, did temper, albeit for a short period,
the
violent
activities of the radicals.
Because
reasons
for an attack were given in only one instance, it is not
known
why
bombings began anew in May, 1987, or what event, if any,
triggered
them.
Since the initial targets were freight forwarding companies,
thorough
which
goods are transported to Cuba via third countries, one
possible motive
might
be to force these companies to stop. It is also not
presently
known
whether all of the attacks are interrelated and are the
result of
efforts
of one group, or if they are alike solely because of the
general nature
of
the target - anti-Castroism - and are being committed by
more than one
group.
Before this can be determined, there are many differences
and
similarities
which need to be considered regarding targets, victims and
modus
operandi.
Of
the
13 attacks which appear to be anti-Castro in nature and
which have been
designated
as either terrorist incidents or suspected terrorist
incidents, nine
involved
the use of pipe bombs, of which one failed to
detonate. They are
as
follows:
--
May
1, 1987, a pipe bombing at Cubanacan in Miami;
--
May
2, 1987, a pipe bombing at Almacen El Espanol in Hialeah,
Florida;
--
May
25, 1987, a pipe bombing at Cuba Envios in Miami
--
July
30, 1987, a pipe bombing at Machi Community Services in
Miami;
--
August
27, 1987, a pipe bombing at Va Cuba in Hialeah;
--
January
2, 1988, a pipe bombing at Miami-Cuban in Miami;
--
May
3, 1988, a pipe bombing at the Cuban Museum of Arts and
Culture in
Miami;
--
May
26, 1988, a bombing at the residence of the executive
director for
the Institute of Cuban Studies in
Coral
Gables, Florida, claimed by the AIC;
--
September
5, 1988, a pipe bombing at Bela Cuba in Miami;
--
September
18, 1988, a bombing intended for a leader of the Reunion
Flotilla,
a group which advocates that all persons
should be able to enter or leave
Cuba as
they
please, in Miami;
--
February
24, 1989, an attempted pipe bombing at Almacen El Espanol in
Miami;
--
March
26, 1989, a bombing at Marazul Charters in Miami; and
--
September
10, 1989, a bombing at Super Optical in Hialeah.
Of
the
12 successful bombings, 11 occurred either during the late
evening or
early
morning hours, between 10:20 p.m. and 3:45 a.m.; the
most recent
attack
occurred at 5:50 a.m. Although some of the bombings
have
specifically
targeted residences, there have been no deaths or injuries
as a result.
None
of
the pipe bombings were claimed, and no prior warning calls
were
received.
Only one of the other bombings was claimed, and in another,
targeting a
leader
of the Reunion Flotilla, there was a warning call but
no claim of
credit.
These two attacks were unlike any of the other bombings in
that private
residences
were targeted. In the other attacks, businesses and in
one case a
museum
were targeted.
The
first
six bombings have been positively linked through forensic
analysis.
Toolmarks on the six devices are identical, indicating that
the same
tool
was used to construct them. Tests have not been
completed on the
remaining
pipe bombings. It has not been determined if they are
identical
to
the first six. The first six pipe bombings are also
similar in
that
the targets were Cuban freight forwarding companies.
The other
pipe
bombings are similar to the first six attacks in that Cuban
businesses
were
attacked. In all of the pipe bombings, the targets
involved
pro-Communist
Cuban interests.
In
addition,
forensic analysis has not been completed on the remaining
four
explosions.
Therefore, it has not been determined whether they are
similar in
construction
to one another or to the first six pipe bombings. Two
of these
attacks
were against targets similar to those of the pipe bombings,
(Cuban
businesses).
But two were completely different in that residences were
targeted and
one
of these was claimed.
On
May
25, 1988, a bomb detonated at the home of the executive
director of the
Institute
of Cuban Studies in Hialeah, Florida. A telephone
caller to a
Spanish
language radio station claimed credit for the bombing on
behalf of the
AIC.
This bombing was the eight in the series that began in May,
1987.
The
other attack against a residence occurred on September 18,
1988.
The
intended target was the residence of a leader of the Reunion
Flotilla.
On September 17, a telephone call to the residence advised
that a
bombing
would occur and that a certain individual would be
responsible.
On
September 18, a bomb exploded. However, it was at a
residence
with
an address similar to but different from the one at which
the warning
call
was received. A telephone caller later claimed that
the wrong
building
had been bombed. The person whose name was given as
being
responsible
was found not to have been involved.
Several
suspects
have been identified in the current wave of bombings.
However,
because of the differences in the targets and in the types
of bombing
devices
used, it is not known if the same individuals or group is
responsible
for
all of the attacks.
Furthermore,
there
are some indications, that the bombings may have connections
to
earlier
anti-Castro militants. The one recent bombing that was
claimed by
AIC,
for example, was reportedly committed on behalf of Orlando
Bosch.
Bosch,
following his flight to South America in 1974, became
involved in
another
anti-Castro group. In 1976, he was arrested by
Venezuelan
authorities
for his involvement in the bombing of a Cuban airliner in
which 73
people
died. Bosch spent 11 years in prison during which he
was twice
tried
and acquitted for this crime. He was released in
August
1987.
Three months later, he applied for permission to enter the
United
States
but was denied a non-immigrant visa. Nevertheless, on
February
16,
1988, he arrived in Miami, Florida, without entry documents
and was
arrested
by the U.S. Marshals on a warrant based on his 1974 parole
violation.
He served three months in prison.
Following
his
release on May 16, 1988 Bosch was rearrested by the
Immigration and
Naturalization
Service (INS) and given notice that the U.S. Government
considered him
excludable.
His parole into the United States was also denied by the
U.S. District
Court,
Southern District of Florida. Because he posed a
flight risk, he
was
ordered detained until a decision could be reached on his
deportation.
On May 25, 1988, the AIC-claimed bombing occurred. The
caller who
claimed
credit stated that if Bosch was not released within a
specified time,
reprisals
would be taken against the INS district director in
Miami. On
June
2, 1988, the day after Bosch legal efforts to effect his
release from
custody
were denied, the AIC threatened to bomb the Miami INS office
if Bosch
was
not released.
On
this
same date, a letter was received by a Spanish language
newspaper
in
Los Angeles. The letter states that the group
had bombs and
grenades
and that the group had already committed eight bombings in
Miami.
No
connection however, could be found between this letter and
the Miami
bombings.
The
Orlando
Bosch issue was given as the motive for only one of the
attacks, but it
may
be a factor of greater significance. U.S. Government
efforts to
deport
Bosch have been decried by a number of his supporters,
including
militants
such as Ramon Sanchez, an Omega 7 member, who had been
convicted and
imprisoned
in 1984. Threats of violence have been made against
FBI and INS
offices
should the Government's efforts to deport Bosch be
successful.
Sanchez's
open support for Bosch, as well as his past propensity for
violence,
have
caused law enforcement to look into any involvement that h
or any other
Omega
7 members may have with these bombings.
The
Bosch
deportation issue cannot account for all of the bombings as
it (the
issue)
did not become a factor until after seven bombings had
occurred.
The
bombings initially may have been influenced by the paroling
of Omega 7
members,
such as Ramon Sanchez. The attacks may have been
committed to
show
that the militant anti-Castro movement had not been
destroyed despite
the
Omega 7 arrests and Arocena's continued imprisonment.
If
all
of the bombings are the responsibility of one group, the
Bosch issue
may
have been seized upon as a means to expand the group's
activist base by
attracting
militant Bosch supporters. If more than one group is
responsible
for
the attack, the second group may have been influenced by the
seven
successful
bombings within a year. It may also be possible that
some of the
bombings
are being committed by pro-Castro forces as a means of
bringing adverse
publicity
to and law enforcement efforts against anti-Castro factions.
What
has become
apparent
is that the bombings will not likely end until there no
longer exists a
reason
for them to continue. Arrests may cause the bombings
to cease
temporarily,
but it will not cause them to stop entirely. The
history of the
militant
anti- Castro movement has proven this. The issue
behind the
attacks
is so emotional a topic that it remains largely unchanged
even after 30
years.
And there is no reason to suspect that it will cease to be
an issue as
long
as the status quo remains. It therefore behooves law
enforcement
to
continue efforts to apprehend those responsible for the
attacks, but at
the
same time, not lose sight of the fact that eventually
bombers will
return
as long as Castro is in power or Cuba remains communist.
End of Page
Copyright
1998-2014 Cuban Information Archives. All Rights
Reserved.
